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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
This thesis deals with the topic of game theory and its branch, matching theory. The
goal is to find out, through interesting examples, what these fields of mathematics handle,
what kind of situations are explored and how, and how they are modelled and analysed.
We see few interesting algorithms behind solutions of matching problems.
The main focus is on one specific, vastly studied basic question of matching theory:
the marriage problem. After a brief look at topics mentioned above, we take a look at
few differently modelled and solved marriage problems and a specific cohort mating game
described by Steve Alpern and Diane Reyniers 2005. The aim is to form a game of our
own in base of that but using a different kind of set up. Our game differs from Alpern’s
and Reyniers’ with respect of preferences: in the previous game preferences are assumed
to be common and we want to find out what happens in an otherwise similar kind of set
up where every individual has unique preferences over all others.
2
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Vocabulary
Here is some useful vocabulary to understand the upcoming text
• Matching is a happening, where two individuals (or university and an applicant,
kidney donor and a patient and so on) are joined together and they have a possibility
to form a long-term relationship with each other. We speak of matching µ when all
individuals taking part in the game are matched with another player and this can
be represented with a matrix
µ =
{
m1 m2 m3 ...
f1 f2 f3 ...
}
,
where the two groups being matched are M & F and every individual m ∈ M is
represented in the top line and individuals f ∈ F in the bottom line. Every two
individuals on top of each other are matched.
• Mating happens, when two matched individuals accept each other.
• Non-matched pair is two individuals that are not matched together.
2.2 Definitions
Here we define some of the most used terms. First of all we need to have a definition for
matching, which is probably the most used term in this paper.
Definition 2.1. A matching µ is a funktion µ : M ∪ F → M ∪ F expressing matchings
such that for all m ∈M and f ∈ F
• µ(m) = f ⇔ µ(f) = m meaning (m, f) is a matched pair in µ.
• µ(m) /∈ F ⇒ µ(m) = m
• µ(f) /∈M ⇒ µ(f) = f
When forming matchings we are often interested in individuals preferences over who
he or she would most preferably like to be matched with.
Definition 2.2. We use symbol >m to express individual m ∈M ’s preferences. So, by
• f >m µ(m) we mean that m prefers f to the pair he is matched with in matching
µ,
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• f1 >m f2 we mean that m prefers female f1 to female f2,
• f >m m we mean that m prefers f to remaining single, f is acceptable for m
• m >m f we mean that m prefers staying single to f , f is unacceptable for m.
We are of course interested in what can we say about the matchings formed. A
matching can be for example rational, blocked, stable or Pareto efficient.
Definition 2.3. If there is two individuals who would like to elope with each other rather
than stay with partners they are matched with, they are said to block the matching µ.
In other words (f,m) is a blocking pair, if and only if f >m µ(m) and m >f µ(f).
Definition 2.4. An individual m is said to block the matching µ, if he or she prefers
staying single to staying with the mate he or she is matched with, m >m µ(m).
Definition 2.5. A matching µ is individually rational, if it is not blocked by any indi-
vidual.
Definition 2.6. (Pareto efficiency) Matching µ is Pareto efficient, if there is no other
matching ν such that ν(i) ≥i µ(i) for all i ∈M ∪F and ν(i) >i µ(i) for some i ∈M ∪F .
Definition 2.7. Matching µ is stable, if it is not blocked by any pair or individual. Any
stable matching is also Pareto efficient.
We also have terms m-optimality and f-optimality describing matchings’ qualities and
for whom is the matching most preferable.
Definition 2.8. A Stable matching µ is said to be m-optimal, if no man prefers any other
stable matching ν to µ, µ(m) ≥m ν(m) for all m ∈M . F-optimality is defined similarly.
When an individual can be indifferent with possible mates, then there are two different
levels of favouring one matching over another. One can favour one matching weakly or
strongly over another.
Definition 2.9. An individual i ∈M ∪F favours matching µ weakly over matching ϑ, if
µ(i) ≥ iϑ(i).
Definition 2.10. An individual i ∈ M ∪ F favours matching µ strongly over matching
ϑ, if µ(i) >i ϑ(i).
With these definitions we can already get far with our study of game- and matching
theories. More definitions will follow when new concepts are used and in need of more
precise definition.
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2.3 What is game theory?
Biomathematic’s target is to model real life situations via mathematical models. A math-
ematical model is a mathematical structure with an interpretation[6]. Game theory does
so by modelling decision-making events by games. A game is a model of a situation where
two or more intelligent rational decision-makers, players, interact and ones payoff does
not depend only on his or her own decisions but on the other players decisions as well.
Every player has a set of strategies to choose from which to play. What we want to
find out is which strategies should the players play to end up in a stable situation: Nash
equilibrium for example.
Definition 2.11. (Nash equilibrium) We denote player i’s strategies by si and the set
of his strategies by Si. A strategy profile is a vector of strategies s = (s1, s2, ..., sn)
where si ∈ Si and n is the number of players in the game. Nash equilibrium is such
strategy profile that no player alone wants to diverge from it. In other words s∗ is a Nash
equilibrium, if for every i the payoff by playing strategy s∗i is greater that by playing any
other si, given that every other player j plays strategy s∗j .
2.3.1 Prisoners dilemma
One example of the most known and extensively studied games is prisoner’s dilemma.
The players of the game are two prisoners captured and given two choices (strategies to
play) by the police. The police suspects the prisoners have committed to a serious crime,
but they can prove only some smaller offences. So the prisoner’s options are to confess
or deny. The prisoners are interrogated in different rooms and they have no possibility
to deliberate with each other. If one of them confesses and the other one doesn’t, the
one confessing will be released and the other one gets a sentence of 15 years in prison. If
neither confesses, both are judged only for the smaller offences and get one year of jail
time. If both confess, both get reduced sentences of five years in prison. What to do?
Payoffs of prisoners are shown in the following matrix:
confess deny
confess -5,-5 0,-15
deny -15,0 -1,-1
Since no jail time is better that any at all, the years spent in prison are marked as
negative numbers in the matrix. This way the largest number describes the best possible
payoff. In every box there is a pair of payoffs, the first one for prisoner 1, the row-player,
and the later for prisoner two, the column-player.
To find the Nash equilibrium of the game we can simply mark one player’s best so-
lutions given the other one’s decision like this: if it is given that the player 2 confesses,
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player 1’s possible payoffs are -5 or -15. -5 is greater, so we mark that one. If given that
the player 2 plays strategy of denying, player 1 can get 0 or -1 as his payoff. Clearly 0 is
greater so we mark that one.
confess deny
confess -5*,-5 0*,-15
deny -15,0 -1,-1
So actually apart from what player 2 chooses, confessing always gives a better payoff
for player 1. Player 2 has a similar situation as we can see by similarly marking his best
payoffs given player 1’s strategy.
confess decline
confess -5*,-5* 0*,-15
decline -15,0* -1,-1
Now the Nash equilibrium is found in the box where both players payoffs are marked.
There neither one of the players can better his own payoff by changing his own strategy
to denying if the other one keeps confessing. The interesting thing here to note is that
by choosing rationally the best strategies we end up in a situation where both prisoners
confess, even though both would get a better payoff if they both denied.
6
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3 Matching Theory
Matching theory is a branch of game theory where we are looking into stability of different
kind of matchings. On the base of matching theory is a little simpler search theory. Search
theory’s goal is to model situations where a single agent is searching for something. For
example a firm is looking for an employee to hire. The firm interviews applicant and
after every interview it needs to either hire the applicant or reject him. Once rejected
applicants are not coming back, so the question is who to hire. Or when to stop searching.
Another example is a firm developing a new invention and searching for a perfect timing
for introducing it to a global market. These kind of problems can be solved with the
theory of optimal stopping.
Example 3.1. One interesting example of optimal stopping is the so called optimal
parking problem described by Morris H. DeGroot (1970) [10]. The basic idea is that a
driver is driving along one-way street looking for a parking spot. He prefers to park as
close as possible to his destination. So the question is, how long should he try to get
closer and when to park his car to an available spot. How can he maximize his possibility
to choose the best vacant parking spot?
We assume that
• parking is allowed on one side of the street only,
• the driver can inspect only one parking spot at a time. If the spot is vacant, he may
park there, otherwise is forced to continue.
• Every spot is vacant with probability p, (0 < p < 1),
• and that the vacancy of a spot does not depend on the vacancy of other spots.
If the driver reaches his destination without parking, he will continue to the next vacant
spot. Drivers loss when he parks his car is proportional to the distance he must walk to
his destination. So if he parks to a spot k spots from his destination, his loss will be α|k|,
α > 0.
Answer. If the driver reaches his destination, he will keep driving till the next avail-
able spot. The probability that the first available spot lies k spots from the destination,
is P (D = k) = (1 − p)kp, where D is the distance the driver needs to walk back. D is
geometrically distributed D ∼ Geom(p), so the expected distance to walk is E(D) = q/p,
where q = 1− p. Say Vk is the minimal expected walking distance starting from k spots
before the destination. For k = 0 we have
V0 = q/p.
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And for k ≥ 1 we have
Vk = qVk−1 + pmin {k, Vk−1} .
Let’s set k∗ = inf {k ≥ 0 : Vk < k}. For k ≤ k∗ we have
Vk = qVk−1 + pk.(3.1)
Vk−1 = qVk−2 + p(k − 1)
Vk−2 = qVk−3 + p(k − 2)
...
Vk−n = qVk−n−1 + p(k − n)
Now inserting formulas Vk−1 − Vk−k to (3.1), we get
Vk = qVk−1 + pk
= q(qVk−2 + p(k − 1)) + pk
= q(q(qVk−3 + p(k − 2)) + p(k − 1)) + pk
...
= qkV0 + p
k∑
s=1
sqk−s
= qkV0 + p
q(qk − 1) + k(−q) + k
(q − 1)2
= qkV0 + p
q(qk − 1) + k(1− q)
p2
= qkV0 +
q(qk − 1) + kp
p
= qk
q
p
+ k + (qk − 1)q
p
= k +
(2qk − 1)q
p
(3.2)
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Hence k∗ = inf
{
k ≥ 0 : 2qk < 1}. For k ≥ k∗ we have Vk = Vk∗ . Vk < k when
k ≥ k + (2qk − 1)q
p
0 ≥ (2qk − 1)q
p
0 ≥ 2qk − 1
1 ≥ 2qk
1
2
≥ qk
ln
1
2
≥ k ln q
k ≤ ln
1
2
ln q
k ≤ − ln 2
ln(1− p)(3.3)
Since k∗ = inf
{
k ≥ 0 : 2qk < 1}, we have k∗ = − ln 2
ln(1− p) . So the answer to this problem
is that the driver should keep driving until he is k∗ spots away from his destination and
then park to the next vacant spot, where
k∗ = − ln 2
ln(1− p) .
3.1 Two-sided matching
When the search goes both ways, for example a student is applying to a group of univer-
sities and every university is searching for the best candidates to admit. Or a group on
patients in need of a kidney are searching one and donors are looking for suitable patients.
Then the outcome of the matching process becomes non-trivial and problem is not about
optimal stopping any more, but becomes two-sided matching problem.
3.1.1 Kidney Exchange
One interesting matching problem introduced by Abdulkagiroglu A. & Sönmez T.[4] de-
scribes a situation where we have a group of patients in need of a kidney. Each patient
has a friend or relative willing to donate her one, but can’t because of incompatibility (of
blood-type or some tissue rejection). There is a solution to this dilemma: for a group of
this kind of patient-donor pairs we can find a matching such that every patient is matched
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to a compatible donor or a waitlist option. The waitlist option means that the patient
gets a high priority on the queue of cadaver kidneys in change of her donor donating
kidney to some compatible patient. If some patient is matched with waitlist option, so is
some donor, who then will donate a kidney to someone in the cadaver queue.
This matching is achieved by Top Trading Cycles and Chains (TTCC) mechanism. To
understand this mechanism we first need to define few terms. Let’s mark every patient i
with pi and her donor pair with di.
Definition 3.2. A cycle is a ordered list of patients and donors
(dj, pj, ..., dk, pk)
such that each element of the list points to the next element. The first element of the list
dj is considered as the next element to the last pk.
Definition 3.3. W-chain is a ordered list of patients and donors
(dj, pj, ..., dk, pk)
such that every element of the list points to the next element. Except the last element,
patient pk, who points to w. The last pair (dk, pk), whose patient receives a kidney from
a cadaver queue is said to be the head of the w-chain and the first pair (dj, pj), whose
donor donates his kidney to someone on the cadaver queue is said to be the tail of the
w-chain.
Underlying TTCC mechanism is an algorithm consisting of following several rounds.
1. Every patient points to a donor with a kidney compatible for her. If there exist no
such donor, patient points to the waitlist option. Each donor points to her original
patient pair.
2. Now there exist a group of cycles and w-chains. If there is any cycles, carry out the
corresponding exchanges and remove all patients and donors in every cycle.
3. Repeat steps one and two until no cycles exist.
4. If no pairs remain, we are done. Otherwise there exist a group of w-chains. Choose
the longest w-chain and lock it (there are some alternative rules for which w-chain
to choose, but we only look at choosing the longest). The assignments for pairs in
this w-chain are final, but the tail of the chain remains available for the next round.
5. For every patient and donor still available (not part of a chosen and locked w-chain)
start again from step one. Now each patient can point to an available donor, waitlist
option or a tail of a locked w-chain.
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6. Carry on the same way until there is no unlocked pairs left. Then just carry on with
the assigned exchanges.
Theorem 3.4. Roth, Sönmez and Ünver 2004 introduce a theorem saying the following:
TTCC mechanism implemented with such a chain-selection rule, where any w-chain se-
lected at a non-terminal round remains in the procedure and thus the donor at its tail
remain available for the next round, is Pareto efficient.
According to theorem above our TTCC mechanism introduced previously is Pareto
efficient.
Example 3.5. Let’s look at an example, where we have a set of 10 donor-patient pairs.
To simplify following graphics we mark every patient with a capital letter and its paired
donor with corresponding small letter. So every small letter inside a circle is pointing to
the capital letter next to it and every capital letter is pointing to the small letter in the
circle shown by arrows.
In the figure 1 is the situation after the first step, every patient pointing to her first
choice of a donor and donors pointing to paired patients. One cycle and one w-chain is
formed. Now we remove the cycle, patient A receives kidney from donor b, B receives
Figure 1: Situation after step 1.
kidney from c and C receives kidney from a and they all are removed from the system.
NowD and I are not pointing to any donor, so they choose again. Every other patients
preferences stay unchanged and they just keep pointing to whom they previously where
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pointing to. Let’s say D now points to i and I points to e. We now have a new cycle and
since i is part of this cycle and is going to be removed, J pointing to it moves to her next
choice of a donor and now points to g. We are in a situation described by figure 2.
Figure 2: One cycle and two w-chains.
We carry on with the exchanges assigned by the existing cycle and remove individuals
D, d,E, e, I, i. No more cycles are formed so we move on to the fourth step. The longest
w-chain is the one with tail (k,K) and head (g,G), so we lock that one. (h,H) is the
only pair left and H has now two options: to point to the waitlist option or point to the
locked w-chains tails donor k. She prefers the donor k to the waitlist option since k:s
kidney is compatible to her, so she now points to k and we are left with only one w-chain
shown in the next picture. No unlocked pair remain, we will carry on with the exchanges
Figure 3: Final w-chain.
assigned by the single w-chain, H receives a kidney from k, K receives a kidney from j
and J receives kidney from g. G will get a high priority on the cadaver waiting list and
h will donate a kidney for someone on that list.
This matching
µ =
{
A B C D E G H I J K w
b c a i d w k e g i h
}
,
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found by our Pareto efficient TTCC mechanism, is Pareto efficient.
In the following sections we look deeper into one particular two-sided matching prob-
lem: marriage problem.
3.2 Marriage problem
Marriage problem is one of the key puzzles of matching theory. The basic idea is that we
have two distinct groups, say males and females, and individuals of these groups seek to
form a long-term relationship with a member of the other group. We want to end up in
a situation, where all matchings are stable.
3.3 Deferred acceptance algorithm
Theorem 3.6. There exists a stable matching (or a set of stable matchings) in every
monogamous matching system [2].
Proof. We prove the theorem above by introducing an algorithm that can be used to find
a stable matching for any monogamous matching system.
This way of finding stable matchings was originally presented by Gale and Shapely
(1962)[3]. Lets call the two groups hoping to form marriages with each other men and
women. We play n rounds. On the first round every male proposes to his most preferred
female. Every female receiving any proposals, chooses her favourite male proposing to
her, keeps him engaged and rejects all the rest. All the following rounds go on on two
steps:
• Every male not engaged at the beginning of the round, proposes to his most preferred
female who has not yet rejected him. If there is no acceptable female left, he remains
single.
• Every female receiving one or more proposals, chooses her most preferred male and
rejects the rest. This may include rejecting previously engaged male.
The game ends, when no more proposals are presented. This will happen after finite
number of rounds [3]. The individuals not currently engaged will remain single and the
rest will form a marriage with the individual they are matched with at the final round.
This is called the male-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. Clearly all matchings
in the end are stable, since if a male prefers any other female to the one he is currently
married to, he would had already proposed to her and been rejected by this preferred
female. Like wise no female prefers any male that would be willing to elope with her
to her current spouse, since she has already rejected all the male that prefer her to the
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females they are currently married to. So there exists absolutely no blocking pair. No
blocking individual exists either, since no man proposes a female who is non-acceptable to
him and no woman accepts a non-acceptable male. Since we can find a stable matching
to any marriage problem by this algorithm, theorem above holds.
One would maybe think that in this game the females would have more power, since
they have the option of rejecting or accepting any male proposing to them. But actually
it is totally the other way around. Using male-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm
we will find a stable matching to every marriage problem. More precisely we will every
time end up in a m-optimal stable matching, which is not only weakly favoured to any
other stable matching ν by every male µ(m) ≥m ν(m) for all m ∈ M , but is always the
worst stable matching for the females ν(f) ≥f µ(f) for all f ∈ F .
Example 3.7. Lets say we have a group of three men {Joey, Ross, Chandler} and a
group of three women {Phoebe, Monica, Rachel} The preferences of each individual are
shown in the next table:
Individual First choice Second choice Third choice
Joey Phoebe Rachel Monica
Ross Rachel Phoebe Monica
Chandler Monica Phoebe Rachel
Phoebe Ross Chandler Joey
Monica Joey Ross Chandler
Rachel Joey Ross Chandler
The m-optimal solution is really simple. In the first round every man proposes to
his favourite woman. Since they prefer different women, every woman receives only one
proposal, accepts it and the game ends. So the m-optimal solution is
µ =
{
Joey Ross Chandler
Phoebe Rachel Monica
}
.
When women are the proposing sex, the game goes as follows. First Monica and
Rachel both propose to Joey, Phoebe proposes to Ross. Ross gets only one proposal
and keeps Phoebe engaged for the moment. Joey prefers Rachel over Monica and rejects
Monicas proposal. On the next round Monica is the only one rejected so she moves on and
proposes to her second favourite man Ross. Ross prefers his previously engaged Phoebe
over Monica so he rejects Monica. The game moves to the third round, Monica is again
the only one rejected and proposes now to her third choice Chandler. Chandler accepts
and the game ends. So the f-optimal solution is
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µ =
{
Joey Ross Chandler
Rachel Phoebe Monica
}
.
Clearly the m-optimal and f-optimal solutions differ. There might still be some else
stable solutions.
Example 3.8. Lets say we have a group of three men {Toni, Bruce, Peter} and a group
of three women {Saara, Sofia, Evelyn} The preferences of each individual are shown in
the next table:
Individual First choice Second choice Third choice
Toni Saara Evelyn Sofia
Bruce Saara Sofia Evelyn
Peter Sofia Evelyn Saara
Saara Toni Peter Bruce
Sofia Bruce Toni Peter
Evelyn Peter Toni Bruce
Since Saara and Toni are each others first choices, they will be a blocking pair in any
matching µ∗ in which they are not paired together. Hence to find a stable matching we
can remove them from the system and look at the reduced preference table:
Individual First choice Second choice
Bruce Sofia Evelyn
Peter Sofia Evelyn
Sofia Bruce Peter
Evelyn Peter Bruce
Now let the men propose to their favourite female. Both Bruce and Peter prefer Sofia,
so Sofia gets to proposals. Since she prefers Bruce to Peter, she will reject Peter. We will
move on to the next round, where only Peter is now proposing to his second favourite
female Evelyn And Evelyn will accept. No men are rejected, the game ends and stable
marriages are found. We end up in a m-optimal marriage situation which looks like this:
µ =
{
Toni Bruce Peter
Saara Sofia Evelyn
}
In this example it’s easy to see that actually the f -optimal stable marriage would look
exactly the same, since if females were the proposing sex, Sofia would propose to Bruce
and Evelyn would propose to Peter. Males would accept the proposals they each receive,
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no-one would be rejected and the game would end in the situation above. This is also the
unique stable solution to this problem.
Theorem 3.9. If f -optimal stable matching and m-optimal stable matching are the same,
then there cannot exist any other[2].
Proof. Lets assume µ is m-optimal stable matching and ν is f-optimal stable matching for
same set of groups. Lets assume µ = ν and let ϑ be any other stable matching.
From definition it follows that
µ(m) ≥ ϑ(m) ≥ ν(m), for all m ∈M.
Since µ(m) = ν(m), we have
µ(m) ≥ ϑ(m) ≥ µ(m)
From which follows
ϑ(m) = µ(m)for all m ∈M
And hence µ is the unique stable solution.
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4 Alpern and Reyniers cohort mating game
Steve Alpern and Diane Reyniers (2005)[1] introduce and analyse a cohort matching game
Γn(M1, F1), where n rounds are played.
Fist they make few assumptions:
• Initially males have their fitness distributed on [0, 1] according to a continuous cumu-
lative probability distributionM1 and similarly females have their fitness distributed
on the same scale according to F1.
• These distributions are known.
• Total populations of males and females are equal in each round. (Actually assuming
equal initial populations is enough since matings takes the same number of individ-
uals away from both populations in each round).
If a male has a fitness level m, we simply speak of male m and similarly we speak of
female f , when her fitness level is f .
The game goes on as follows. At the beginning of each round matching µ is formed.
Individuals matched in µ are chosen randomly, meaning that every males probability to
be matched with a female with fitness in interval Y ∈ [0, 1], is simply the fraction of
females with fitness levels in that interval at the beginning of this particular round. After
matching every individual has two options: to accept the mate or to continue to the next
round unmated. Mutual acceptance means mating has happened and the pair leaves the
pool. After once leaving there is no returning. Each individual of a mated pair receives
the others fitness as payoff. The main question is, who to accept and who to reject to
obtain the best possible payoff - what strategy of choosiness to play.
When the number of rounds in the game is n, a male m has a strategy
g = (g1(m), ..., gn−1(m))
where for each round k ∈ [1, n − 1], gk(m) tells the lowest acceptable fitness level. So if
matched with a female f in round k, m will accept if and only if y ≥ gk(m). Similarly a
female f has a strategy
h = (h1(m), ..., hn−1(m))
telling which fitness levels to accept on each round. At the final round n everybody will
accept the pair they are matched with and hence the strategy only tells acceptable fitness
levels up to n−1 rounds. So the individuals don’t consider any other property than fitness
level of the opposite group when choosing if to accept or not. And hence the fitness level
is individuals permanent feature, every female thinks the same male is the most desirable,
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secondarily desirable and so on. So ranks the males in the same order and like wise does
the men. That is why we say that the preferences are common.
When strategy pair (g, h) is known, one can calculate male m’s expected value υ1k(m)
if he is unmated at the beginning of round k. Similarly an expected value υ2k(f) can be
calculated for a female f , who is unmated at the beginning of round k.
Definition 4.1. A strategy pair (g, h) is an equilibrium if and only if
gk(m) = υ
1
k+1(m)
and
hk(f) = υ
2
k+1(f)
for all k ∈ [1, n− 1] and all m ∈Mk and f ∈ Fk.
In other words equilibrium is such a strategy profile that every individual will accept
a mate they are matched with if and only if the fitness level of that mate exceeds the
expected fitness level of the individual he or she would be matched with in the next round.
Example 4.2. [1] Lets look at a symmetric, game with two rounds. By symmetry we
mean that the initial distributions of the two populations being matched are identical.
In addition we are looking uniform game meaning these identical distributions are also
uniform. Let’s look for a symmetric equilibria. Such that g = h and every individual
in the game playes this same strategy. In this case also holds υ = υ1 = υ2. So the
equilibrium condition now becomes
g1(x) = υ2(x), x ∈M ∪ F.
So we need to find υ2(i), which equals the mean fitness in the second (and final) round.
To simplify our notations we mark this cutoff acceptance value by u = υ2(x) = g1(x). If
every individual x > u will be accepted in the first round, then every individual x < u will
definitely continue to the next round unmated and individuals x > u will stay unmated
with probability u, the probability he or she is matched with an individual below u. So
the total population (of both males and females) at the beginning of period 2 will be
1(u) + u(1− u) = 2u− u2.
Hence the mean fitness in the second round will be(∫ u
0
xdx+ u
∫ 1
u
xdx
)
/(2u− u2)
=
1
2
u2 + u(1
2
− 1
2
u2)
2u− u2
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=
1
2
(−u− 1 + u2
−2 + u
)
.
At a symmetric equilibrium this will equal the cutoff acceptance value u, so we set
u =
1
2
(−u− 1 + u2
−2 + u
)
.
Solving this we get
u2 − 3u+ 1 = 0
and by inserting this to the quadratic formula we get
u =
3
2
− 1
2
√
5 = 0, 38197.
This is the symmetric equilibrium strategy in the symmetric uniform game. Below is
the mean fitness in the second (final) period as a function on choosiness. The unique
intersection with the 45 degree line denotes the equilibrium u = 0, 38197
Figure 4: [1] Mean fitness in period 2 as function of choosiness.
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5 Mating with varying preferences
In many cases it’s logical to presume that individuals don’t rank each other only by one’s
fitness, but every individual has his own preferences over what qualities he finds attractive.
One prefers intelligence, another thinks kindness is the most important quality of a person.
So we are motivated to modify the Alpern & Reyniers cohort mating game introduced in
the previous section in that way, that we change the assumption of fitness levels to be one’s
only significant quality in the mate selection. And we introduce individuals personalized
preference order of the opposite group.
M and F are the two groups seeking to form a long-term relationship. We speak
of males (M) and females (F ). M1&F1 mean the initial population sizes of each group
respectively. For simplicity we assume the initial population sizes to be equal. With the
same model we can still study groups of different sizes by adding some "ghost" members
to the smaller group: they will be the last ones in every individuals preference list and
being paired with a ghost in the end means staying single[1].
5.1 The game
At the beginning of every round k individuals are randomly paired, forming a matching
µk. They either accept or reject the mate they are paired with. If both accept, the pair
will form a marriage and leave the pool - a mating occurs. Mated individual will receive
his or her mates order number in his or her own preference list as his or her pay off. Notice
that a smaller pay off here is better, so the best possible pay off is 1.
After every round k M&F decrease by the number of matings and each individuals
preference list is reorganized. The order of one’s preferences does not change, but the
mated individuals are removed from one’s list and the list is being compressed so that the
highest number in the list is always the number of individuals in the opposite group.
Each individual has his or her own strict preference order of the other group. Meaning
one can not be indifferent between two possible mates, but always thinks one is better
that the other. We use notation fm for female f ’s order number in male m’s preference
list. So if f is m’s first choice, then fm = 1.
Individual m ∈M has a strategy
g = (g1(m), ..., gn−1(m))
which tells the lowest order number he will accept in each round. So if matched with f
at round k, m will accept if and only if
fm ≤ gk(m).
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Correspondingly f plays strategy
h = (h1(f), ...hn−1(f))
and so being will accept m if and only if
mf ≤ hk(f)
and a mating will happen if both conditions are satisfied.
5.2 Analysis
Here we analyse the symmetric game Υ2(M1, F1). To find a symmetric equilibria we
assume every individual x ∈M ∪F plays the same strategy on the first round g1(x) = u,
which is the cut off acceptance value at the equilibrium. Now the probability to be mated
with an acceptable individual is u
F1
and the probability to be accepted is the same. Hence
the probability to form a marriage and leave the pool is ( u
F1
)2 and the probability to
stay single and move to the second round is 1 − ( u
F1
)2. And so the expected number of
individuals in each group in the next round will be
(5.1) E(M2) = E(F2) = F1(1− ( u
F1
)2) = F1 − u
2
F1
Figure 5: Expected population size in the second round with respect to u
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On the next round individuals will be randomly matched again. So the possible payoffs
one would receive on the next round are all values between [1,E(F2)] and every payoff is
as likely. So the density function is a constant a and∫ E(F2)
1
adx = 1.
From which we get
a =
1
E(F2)− 1 .
And so the expected order number x of the mate one would be mated with in the second
round is
E(x) =
∫ E(F2)
1
xadx
=
∫ E(F2)
1
x
E(F2)− 1dx
=
1
E(F2)− 1
[
1
2
x2
]E(F2)
1
=
1
2
(E(F2)2 − 1)
(E(F2)− 1)
=
1
2
(E(F2)− 1)(E(F2) + 1)
(E(F2)− 1)
=
1
2
(E(F2) + 1)
=
1
2
(
F1 − u
2
F1
+ 1
)
(5.2)
At a symmetric equilibrium this will equal the cutoff acceptance value u. So we set
(5.3) u =
1
2
(
F1 − u
2
F1
+ 1
)
This equation is hard to solve explicitly, but when the F1 is known, we can get a
approximation for the unique real positive root of u by using computer solving programs.
In the next table is some example values for u for different initial group sizes F1.
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Figure 6: The cutoff value u as a function of initial population size F1. In the figure
F = F1.
F1 u
5 2,416
10 4,491
30 12,778
75 31,419
100 41,774
150 62,485
200 83,196
300 124,62
Example 5.1. Let’s look at a example of game Υ2(5, 5), whereM = {A,B,C,D,E} and
F = {a, b, c, d, e}. The preference orders are as follows:
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Individual 1 2 3 4 5
a A B C D E
b A C B E D
c C D E A B
d D E C A B
e E A B C D
A a c b d e
B e d a b c
C c a d e b
D a e d b c
E e a d c b
Round 1. Every individual is randomly matched with another. Following matching is
formed:
µ =
{
a b c d e
C B A D E
}
.
From the table presented previously we can see that for the initial group size we have
F1 = 5, the cutoff acceptance value u = 1, 319. Let’s assume every player plays this
equilibrium strategyg1(x) = u. It means that every individual i accepts his matched pair
if and only if µ(i) ≤ u. So basically every individual will only accept, if they are matched
with their first choice. Next table shows who accepts the received pair and who will not.
Every pair is represented in the same line, Y means "yes" for acceptance and N means
"no". Also there are represented the order numbers of the drawn pairs, in other words
the payoff one would receive by accepting.
F payoff accept accept payoff M
a 3 N Y 2 C
b 3 N N 4 B
c 4 N Y 2 A
d 1 Y N 3 D
e 1 Y Y 1 E
As we can see, only one pair has mutual acceptance. So the pair (e, E) will form a mar-
riage and leave the pool. All the rest will continue to the next (and final) round unmated.
Round 2. (Final) The preference table when (e, E) looks like this:
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Individual 1 2 3 4
a A B C D
b A C B D
c C D A B
d D C A B
A a c b d
B d a b c
C c a d b
D a d b c
The following matching is formed by random:
µ =
{
a b c d
B A C D
}
.
This is the final round, so everyone will accept and receive as the payoff the order number of
their partner in their own preference list. Payoffs are shown in the next table and marked
by ∗, if one did get a higher payoff he would have gotten by accepting the matched pair
from the previous round.
individual payoff
a 2*
b 1*
c 1*
d 1*
A 3
B 2*
C 1*
D 2*
5.2.1 Cost of waiting c
This models problem is definitely this - if an individual chooses a strategy to just wait
till there is only few or one individual left in the opposite group, he will get a good pay
off despite of who is left, since if there is i individuals left, his pay off will be ≤ i < F1.
In other words, if a male m played strategy g1 = F1 in the first round, he could be mated
with such a female f , that fm = F1 and so his pay off would be F1. But if he simply
waited patiently, it might happen that the same female f would be the only one left in
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the group of females and so the only and first one on m’s preference list. And so m would
get a much better pay off in different rounds by being mated with the same partner.
To make this problem smaller, we can add a cost of waiting c. So if there is a constant
penalty c of entering every new round, which will be added to one’s payoff, then the
equilibrium equation (5.3) becomes
(5.4) u =
1
2
(
F1 − u
2
F1
+ 1
)
+ c.
Figure 7: The cutoff value u with respect to cost of waiting c.
Example 5.2. Let’s look at the same example we had above, but lets introduce a cost of
waiting c = 0, 6. Now we have F1 = 5 and u = 2, 416 + 0, 6 = 3, 016, So on the first round
every individual will accept a mate whose order number in his or her own preference list
is 3 or less. Let’s assume that the matching in the first round is the same
µ =
{
a b c d e
C B A D E
}
.
Possible payoffs received by accepting the mate are the same as in the previous example,
but the Y/N table now looks like this:
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F payoff accept accept payoff M
a 3 Y Y 2 C
b 3 Y N 4 B
c 4 N Y 2 A
d 1 Y Y 3 D
e 1 Y Y 1 E
So moving on to the next and final round we have b, c, A,B. The matching formed by
random in the second round is
µ =
{
b c
B A
}
.
And the payoffs for these individuals are
individual payoff
b 2 + 0, 6 = 2, 6∗
c 1 + 0, 6 = 1, 6∗
A 1 + 0, 6 = 1, 6∗
B 1 + 0, 6 = 1, 6∗
5.2.2 Game Υ3(M1, F1)
Here we take a brief look at the symmetric game Υ3(M1, F1) without the cost of waiting,
where M1 = F1 and 3 rounds are played. Let u and w be the the acceptance values
for rounds 1 and 2 respectively at the symmetric equilibrium. The expected number of
individuals in each group at the beginning of round 3 is
(5.5) E(M3) = E(F3) = E(F2)(1− ( wE(F2))
2) = E(F2)− u
2
E(F2)
,
where
E(F2) = F1 − u
2
F1
as previously calculated. For constant density function α we have∫ E(F3)
1
αdx = 1⇒ α = 1
E(F3 − 1) .
And hence the expected order number x of the mate one would get in the final third
round, in other words the expected payoff if one would stay unmated till the final round
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is
E(x) =
∫ E(F3)
1
xαdx
=
1
2
(
E(F3) + 1
)
=
1
2
(
E(F2)− w
2
E(F2
+ 1
)
=
1
2
(
F1 − u
2
F1
− w
2
F1 − u
2
F1
+ 1
)
=
1
2
(F 21 − u2
F1
− w
2F1
F 21 − u2
+ 1
)
.(5.6)
Which equals the cutoff acceptance value w on the second round. So we set
(5.7) w =
1
2
(F 21 − u2
F1
− w
2F1
F 21 − u2
+ 1
)
.
On the first round one would need to accept the pair they are matched with if and only if
the payoff would be atleast as good as the expected payoff by staying unmated. That is
the expected payoff by playing strategy w at the second round with the probability that
one would be mated at the second round. Plus the expected payoff by staying single till
the third and final round with probability that one is not mated at the second round.
That is
u =
( w
E(F2)
)2 ∫ w
1
x
E(F2)− 1dx+
(
1− ( w
E(F2)
)2)
w
...
=
w4
2
(
F1 − u2F1
)2(
F1 − u2F1 − 1
) − w3(
F1 − u2F1
)2 + w − 12(5.8)
The solution plot of w and u is shown in the next figure.
Here are some approximated values for u and w for some example initial group sizes.
There is also another positive solution pair for every group size, but since in it w < 1 it
is not rationally valid.
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Figure 8: The plot of solution set for w & u.
F1 u w
5 1,386 2,257
10 2,991 4,120
50 15,834 18,986
100 31,884 37,564
150 47,934 56,140
200 63,984 74,717
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6 Conclusion
In this section we go through some summed up thoughts and study about the game we
just formed.
When comparing Alpern & Reyniers cohort mating game[1] to the game just formed
and analysed, we can find out that already one critical change in the set up of the game
makes the whole game completely different. We changed the assumption of common
preferences to varying preferences, which had an vast effect on the analysis and results.
Alpern & Reyniers found out that in their game the cutoff acceptance value u is 0, 38197
when populations are distributed on [0, 1] and two rounds are played. In our model
the cutoff acceptance value depends on the population size, but with reasonable sized
populations we don’t get a acceptance value under 40%. When three rounds are played,
Alpern and Reayniers have found out the cutoff acceptance values for rounds 1 and 2,
u = 0, 3216 and w = 0, 4823 respectively. Our results for u are surprisingly close to that,
since for example population on 200 our value of u is about 31, 99%.
As we see from comparing the tables of approximated u and w values for different initial
population sizes, this model predicts better payoffs when more rounds are played. That
seems logical, since playing several rounds one has several opportunities to be matched
with a partner with high ranking on his preference list.
Adding cost of waiting obviously makes the expected payoff worse, but for some situ-
ations it definitely paints more realistic picture of the real world. Another option would
be adding a constant factor d, to multiply the payoff determined by given mates order
number on each round. This factor or constant can be forgotten all together, if we assume
that an individual forgets all the players who have left the pool.
6.1 Keeping it real
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"[11].
When we want to think what kind of a real life situation does our model describe best,
at first it needs to be a situation where individuals meet up by random. This is what
differs ours algorithm from the deferred acceptance algorithm described in section 3.3.
Secondly matched pairs immediately make up their mind either to accept one another or
keep on searching for a more suitable partner.
One example would be a monogamous animal population pairing, where every indi-
vidual have preferences over the opposite sex. Another would be a wine buyer wandering
around a busy exhibition hall full of vendors. He randomly tastes different vendors’ wines
and when an excellent wine to his taste comes along, he immediately makes an offer to
buy the whole stock.
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